We use evidence from the 2005-2006 reform of the Chinese stock market to study the impact of asset float on stock prices. The reform implies that holders of nontradeable shares compensate the holders of tradeable shares in exchange for their right to sell at a future time. Usually compensation involves an increase in the float. We exploit a company-level data set to measure the price reaction of each company to both the announcement of the details of the reform and the implementation of the compensation plan, using information about the timing of suspension from trading and subsequent readmission of each stock. The setup of the reform process is useful to disentangle the relative roles of information and supply. After studying empirical asset pricing models for the Chinese stock market, we measure abnormal returns and analyze both their time series and their cross sectional properties. We find that the reform process is characterized by positive abnormal returns before the increase in supply; we also find evidence in favor of a negatively sloped demand function. The negative impact of the increase in supply is compensated by speculative behavior, proxied by volume and volatility.
Do es supply affect stock prices? The question has long been studied in the financial literature, originally by Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) in the analysis of secondary equity offerings and then by other authors looking at modifications in the composition of well known indices like the S&P500. Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) find that the prices of stocks added to the S&P500 go up on average 3% on the day of inclusion. An increase in the price of a stock added to an index is not per se ev idence of a downward sloping demand curve. Other factors may be at work, particularly new information about fundamentals and liquidity. Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (2000) analyze the Canadian stock market in the context of an information-free experiment and attribute the price movements to downward sloping demand curves. Brav and Gompers (2003) exploit a situation more directly connected with changes in supply and find that prices on average drop 2% after lockup periods expire.
We use the 2005-2006 reform of the Chinese stock market as a laboratory to bring new empirical evidence to the debate about the relevance of supply in determining stock prices. The reform implies a float increase of most stocks in a market mainly populated by local retail investors. The reform, to be thoroughly described later, aims at eliminating a class of shares, defined nontradeable shares (NTS), which cannot be freely traded on the local stock markets. This is achieved through a process by which holders of nontradeable shares pay compensation to holders of tradeable shares (TS) 3 . Compensation is generally paid by increasing the amount of circulating shares and this implies an interesting possibility to directly evaluate the relation between prices and quantities.
Our empirical study exploits the design of the reform process. After initial experiments with a small number of firms, Chinese authorities publicly declared extension of the process, to be completed by the end of 2006, to all companies traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. According to the reform process, each company must respect a given schedule, including two trading suspensions and subsequent readmissions. Just before the first suspension period holders of NTS agree on the value of the compensation to be offered to the holders of TS. After a public announcement of such agreement there is a first suspension period to allow for possible corrections to the proposal, which then becomes irrevocable. During the second suspension period shareholders formally approve the proposal. At the end of the second suspension period, compensation is then immediately paid, usually in forms implying a stock float increases.
The reform i s therefore characterized by an initial credible announcement on the part of the regulation authorities about the timing and t he organization of the process. This initial announcement is then followed by company-specific announcements about the details of the compensation, involving a future supply shock, and a subsequent time period in which the supply shock actually takes place. We will argue that: (a) most of the relevant information should have been discounted by investors at the time of the public announcement, well before the beginning of the reform process and (b) any remaining information is revealed at the end of the (companyspecific) first suspension period. This gives rise to an information-free analysis of the reaction of stock prices to new supply at the end of the second suspension period.
We are going to compare the null hypothesis of market efficiency with an alternative hypothesis featuring supply effects and speculative bubbles. This alternative hypothesis has been studied by Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) , from now on HSX, who present a theoretical model assuming limited risk absorption on the part of the market. They show that under certain conditions (heterogeneous beliefs, overconfidence and short-sale constraints) prices may systematically exceed fundamental values. Contrary to the standard efficient markets theory, the model predicts a price drop following a float increase, even when such an increase has been expected. Importantly, we are able to test the prediction of the model observing the cross-sectional relation between the change in the price and the increase in the quantity of each stock (i.e. whether stock prices decrease more for stocks with larger increases in float) and not simply the relation between the level of the price and the amount of the float (i.e. whether stocks with a larger float have lower stock prices).
We analyze the 1,301 companies which joined the reform from the beginning of the process, April 2005, until February 2007, representing 98% of the companies supposed to go through the reform process. We carry out an event study and measure the abnormal performance of each stock with respect to a variety of factor models to assess the robustness of our results. In evaluating the price reaction, we correct the observed price change to account for payment of the compensation. We next study cumulative and average abnormal (corrected for compensation and risk) returns and introduce a block-bootstrap resamp ling useful for our sample characterized by firms whose reform overlaps in calendar time. We also study volume and volatility, which, in the model of HSX (2006) , are linked to speculative activity. We finally carry out a cross sectional analysis connecting price changes, volume, volatility and other relevant variables.
Our main findings are as follows. Risk-adjusted stock prices increase substantially (and significantly) during the reform process, except for the period following the second readmission, where prices stabilize. The results are robust across factor pricing models. Volume increases substantially in all the event periods, with a particularly strong rise after the second readmission.
Idiosyncratic volatility also goes up. Cross-sectionally, prices react to the surprise in the compensation assigned to the holders of the TS a s well as to volume and volatility. Most importantly, the increase in asset float taking place after the second readmission is cross-sectionally associated with a decrease in prices. On average, keeping other variables constant, the increase in supply has been associated with a 5.6% price drop. Th ese results are not compatible with standard efficient markets theory because the increase in supply was announced several days before its implementation.
After this introduction, the plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the Chinese stock market, both from the point of view of the papers which are more relevant to our research and from an institutional point of view. The section moreover contains a description of the reform process and of the mechanics by which firms compensate shareholders. Section 3 discusses the theoretical background. Section 4 describes methodological issues , with particular reference to the structure of the event study, the test statistics and the bootstrap procedure. Section 5 describes the empirical results, among which the estimation of various multifactor models for the Chinese stock market, the event study and the cross sectional analysis. Section 6 concludes.
I. The Chinese stock market

A. Institutional setting
Chinese firms typically issue multiple classes of shares. The existence of multiple classes of shares Overseas listed shares are issued by Chinese companies on securities markets outside mainland an average turnover of 500% against a value of 100% for B-shares. The authors show that turnover and risk premium are cross sectionally correlated and are both positively associated with return volatility, taken as a proxy of fundamental uncertainty and as a condition for the relevance of heterogeneous beliefs. Also, the premium is negatively associated with the float of A-shares . MSX (2005) conclude that the market for A-shares is dominated by domestic speculative investors.
Considering these results, t he large discount associated with the transfer of NTS looks like a deserved correction for overvaluation of market prices due to irrationally exuberant domestic retail investors.
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B. The 2005-2006 reform
On April 29, 2005 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced a pilot program to transform NTS into TS through a well-defined process. For each company, the process includes a preliminary phase and two suspension periods. In the preliminary phase, the holders of NTS discuss the compensation proposal to be submitted to the holders of TS. The company then publishes a notice to provide full details of the proposal to shareholders. From that date, that we will call time 0, trading is suspended for the first time. Within ten days, holders of NTS negotiate with the holders of TS. If no corrections are made to the proposal, the company makes a public announcement and the shares resume trading. When revisions to the proposal are requested by holders of TS, the shares only resume trading after such revisions have been accepted and publicly announced. Once the shares resume trading (time 1), no further revisions can be made to the proposal to be submitted for shareholders approval. After this first suspension period, the shares are then suspended for a second time (time 2) after the closing date of registration for participation in shareholders' meeting.
Trading is resumed again after the meeting that ratifies the completion of the reform process and at the same time the compensation is paid (time 3). The reform proposal is approved if (a) at least two - Moreover, holders of TS may be offered compensation in cash or a certain assignment of warrants.
Offers are usually expressed as a percentage of 10 tradeable shares originally held. Table I Table III reports some summary statistics. Columns two and three report the number of companies included in every batch, already described in Figure 1 , as well as their trading location. Usually batches include a substantial number of companies, except for the first experimental batch, which only included 3 companies, and the last batches of our sample, when in many cases the process is still to be completed in February 2007. This means that the market can derive relevant information from the outcome of the reform of each batch and use that information to form expectations about the outcome of the reform for the following batches. We will use this insight when we try to understand the price reaction to the various announcements.
The columns between the fourth and the sixth provide information about the length of the suspension periods. On average the length of the first suspension period is 11 days and that of the second suspension period is 21 days. The second suspension lasts longer because of the various procedures which need to be put in place to inform all the shareholders before the formal vote. The average distance between the day of the first suspension period and the beginning of the second suspension is 8 trading days.
The seventh column reports the percentage of outstanding NTS for each company before the start of the reform process. The grand average is 64% and there is little difference across companies. The eighth column reports the number of shares paid on average to a shareholder holding 10 TS. The grand average is 3.2. The ninth column reports the average (over the three months preceding the start of the reform process) price-to-book value of the companies in the various batches, which is rather stable across batches and averages 2.15. The last column reports the size (as measured by the average market value measured over the three months preceding the start of the reform process for each company) of the companies and shows a downward trend from larger to smaller companies. Figure 2 describes the price of one specific company (Baotou Huazi Intl) before, during and after the reform. In this example the stock price goes up before the first suspension, and again between the first and the second suspension. There is an upward jump upon the day of the first readmission and a downward jump upon the second readmission. Formal econometric analysis will show that this pattern is indeed the most frequent.
II. Theoretical effects
In an efficient market the reform c an affect market valuations only through an impact on expectations of fundamentals. In particular, changes in supply should not be relevant for price determination. Here we briefly discuss the impact of the reform on fundamentals and then explain why our study of the effects of supply on prices is robust with respect to information revelation. We finally discuss stock pricing when the demand function slopes down, with particular reference to the Chinese stock market.
In an efficient market, the reform may affect stock prices through three relevant channels. First, by improving corporate governance and the ownership structure, it might lead to better control on the management and more efficient decisions, improving profitability and dividends and also decreasing risks. This would increase the price of stocks going through the reform. Second, the reform increases the float and that is likely to be positive for liquidity. to the whole stock market. The announcement was judged credible due to the success of the experiments carried out with the first two batches, which suggested only minor modifications to the process originally devised 9 . All investors therefore should have reassessed fundamentals and prices before the company-specific period that we defined time 0. This is an advantage for the empirical design of our study. We are not forced to study the impact of fundamentals when analyzing the reaction of prices to the reform process. Moreover, having already adjusted to news about fundamentals, prices should have reacted only to unanticipated news about the compensation provided at time 1, when the negotiations between holders of NTS and holders of TS are over and information about compensation is completely revealed to the market.
Most importantly, compensation is assigned to the shareholders and the float shock takes place on the date of second readmission, time 3. After correcting for the compensation, prices should not react to the increase in the float if the demand function is flat, as no other information is provided 10 .
The Chinese experiment is interesting also because it involves a current and a future increase in the float on the part of each company. HSX (2006) present a theoretical model assuming limited risk absorption on the part of the market, agents with heterogeneous beliefs, overconfidence, insiders 9 In the early two batches the reform process had to originate from a unanimous request to the directors of the company from all the holders of NTS. From the third batch on the request need to be put forward by only two-thirds of the holders of NTS, see Wan, Yuan and Ha (2005) . 10 A minor reaction could take place in response to the formal approval by the shareholders, eliminating all remaining uncertainty. In practice the process is designed in such a way as to make the formal approval an act devoid of any practical importance. The history of the reform process, where virtually all of the proposals have been accepted by the shareholders, confirms this view and short-sale constraints and show that stock prices should exceed fundamental values due to the presence of an optimism effect (only overoptimistic investors hold stocks while others cannot short them) and of a resale option effect (the possibility to sell stocks to future overoptimistic investors).
The model predicts that an increase in the float has a negative effect on prices, even when it is anticipated . The float increase requires an immediate greater heterogeneity of opinions in order to sustain a certain level of prices, but also a future greater heterogeneity. The latter makes the resale option immediately less valuable. The presence of inside investors, currently constrained by a lockup period, has a positive effect on current prices, again due to overconfidence. The model fits the Chinese case and produces several implications that can be tested empirically. In particular, the model does not simply show that an expected float increase may negatively affect prices. It also predicts that under certain conditions other variables, like volume and volatility, should be positively correlated with stock prices.
III. Methodological issues
In what follows we describe the correction to stock prices to account for payment of the compensation, the estimation of the event study residuals and statistical inference.
A. The compensation-corrected price
On the day of payment of the compensation, price drops similarly to what happens in the case of a dividend, even regardless of any supply or fundamental effect. We therefore need to compute a compensation-corrected price to isolate any change in the price due to supply.
Compensation can be realized through various channels. The standard case is the one in which holders of NTS offer holders of TS a certain number of shares (SH) and/or a certain amount of Yuan (CASH) every 10 shares. The stock price should react in such a way that the total wealth of the tradeable shareholders does not change when the compensation is paid. This is consistent with the possibility of compensation-induced wealth redistribution across the two categories of shareholders. Total wealth redistribution may result from the payment of the compensation and from the change in stock prices. But redistribution of wealth across the two categories is already incorporated into prices at the latest after the initial announcement, which takes place several days before the moment of the second readmission. Here we simply assume that, given the available information set, total wealth of holders of TS should not change overnight as a reaction to payment of the co mpensation. Formally:
where 0 p is the price before the compensation payment, 1 p is the price after the payment, QTS is the number of TS outstanding at the beginning of the reform process.
The compensation can take place by warrants as signment as well. Galai and Schneller (1978) modify the Black-Scholes model to take into account the fact that if a warrant is exercised it increases the number of outstanding shares of the firm and thus dilutes the equity of its shareholders. Following their specification, warrant prices W are given by:
and where S is the stock price, X is the exercise price, N is the number of outstanding shares of stock, M is the number of warrants, γ is the number of shares that can be purchased with each warrant, r is the risk free interest rate 11 , T is the time until expiration, σ is the standard deviation of 
B. The event study
We isolate four event windows over the event period for each stock, associated with the two dates of suspension and readmission of their shares to trading:
1. run-up window (window 1) starts nine days before the first suspension and ends on the suspension itself;
2. release and post -release window (window 2) runs from the first readmission date to eight days after the readmission. This includes the percentage change between the opening price upon readmission and the closing price of the suspension day, the percentage change between the closing price and the opening price on the readmission date and the percentage changes for the remaining 8 days;
3. pre-supply shock window (window 3) runs from ten days before the second suspension to the suspension day;
4. supply shock and post -supply shock window (window 4) runs from the second readmission date to eight days after such date. This includes the percentage change between the opening price upon readmission and the closing price of the suspension day, the percentage change between the closing price and the opening price on the readmission date and the percentage changes for the remaining 8 days.
The event study uses the residuals from a pricing model. We experiment with several pricing models, described below. Each pricing model is estimated with data preceding the beginning of the reform process. For company i involved in the refo rm process we estimate a multifactor model
using observations between t-120 and t-10, where t is the day of the first suspension for stock i and t k r , is the return of the k -th factor-replicating portfolio 13 . Define with
, the estimated parameters. Such parameters are used to compute the estimated errors over the event windows
. Such errors are used to derive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). In the case of windows 1 and 3 the definition is:
where T is the length of the event window. In defining abnormal returns on the readmission day of windows 2 and 4, we notice that any new information should be incorporated into the opening price.
We therefore measure the return on the stock on the readmission date as the difference between the opening price on that date and the closing price of the last trading day before the suspension. We define such a variable for stock i as
The distance between the readmission day and the suspension day may be long and heterogeneous across companies, ranging between few days and 3 months. This creates an asymmetry between the readmission abnormal return and the other returns of windows number 2 and 4. While the readmission abnormal return is the result of the accumulation of idiosyncratic shocks over several days of suspension, the other abnormal returns are daily. Therefore for event windows 2 and 4 we define:
We have also experimented with other estimation periods like t-150/t-10 and t-90/t-10 but results are not affected.
where
is the total rate of return for the k-th factor. We will take this into account when computing the standard errors of our test statistics to allow for the larger variance of the initial abnormal return for windows 2 and 4.
For all event windows, cumulative abnormal returns are then averaged across companies to obtain the mean cumulative abnormal residuals (MCAR):
Before closing this section, notice that for the two event windows 2 and 3 the number of firms with active available residuals depends on the horizon analyzed within the window. In several cases the time length between the first readmission and the second suspension is shorter than ten days.
Suppose that firm A the second suspension takes place six days after the first readmission. It is possible to compute six residuals which can be attributed both to the period following the first readmission and to the period preceding the second suspension. In analyzing any horizon between 1 and 6, firm A therefore actively contributes to the overall results of both event windows. However for horizons larger than or equal to 7 there are missing residuals for this firm. We follow Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) and use the same total number of firms for all the horizons within a given window, simply summing all the available residuals for each date. Therefore, computation of the mean cumulative abnormal residuals may give different results from those obtained by the computation of the mean average abnormal residuals (MAAR) defined as the mean across all firms of the average residuals,
. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) notice that MCAR assigns the same weight to each residual while MAAR assigns a larger weight to residuals of firms with a shorter window.
C. The bootstrap and the variance estimators
In order to test for the existence of abnormal returns we need to estimate the variance of MCAR and MAAR. Such a variance is measured in three ways. Following Campbell, Lo and MacKinaly (1997) , under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals of different firms, the variance of the MCAR is: 
where Z is a matrix of zeros except for the element (1,1) that is equal to 1 and where i L is the length of the suspension period for company i.
The null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is tested by means of the statistic:
which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. The disadvantage of this estimator lies in its assuming independence of residuals across firms. Our event periods are sometimes overlapping across firms because the latter are divided in batches of companies going through the reform process over similar time frames. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) discuss inference in event windows with clustering and notice that standard methods suffer from lack of power. We therefore compute two other estimators.
The second estimator is the cross-sectional variance (CS variance) across mean cumulative and average abnormal returns of the different companies, see Asquith (1983) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) . Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) 
.We resample these abnormal returns by respecting their typical correlation properties.
In order to describe our bootstrap assume there are only three firms, going through the reform To get the right degree of cross correlation we instead extract a (randomly selected) series of 10 consecutive observations from the abnormal residuals of stock A over the year 2005. We do that by randomly selecting a number between 1 and 241, say number k, from a uniform distribution and by considering the sequence of 10 residuals for firm A between k and k+10, selected from the bootstrap estimation period. In order to respect the cross sectional dependence between companies A and B we then consider a sequence of 10 residuals for firm B between k +5 and k+15. In such a way there is a five day overlap in the bootstrapped residuals, corresponding to the overlap that takes place among the residuals in the event windows. As to firm C, we consider 10 residuals from the bootstrap estimation period between j and j+10, where j is another number randomly extracted from a uniform distribution between 1 and 241. In the case of firm C there is no cross correlation to account for 15 .
We now have three artificial time series of abnormal residuals for the three stocks, allowing for cross sectional covariance among them. We repeat the procedure for all the firms and obtain a simulated series of abnormal returns under the null hypothesis. We repeat the procedure 1,000 times and compute an empirical distribution of mean cumulative and average residuals. The comparison between the empirical distribution and the actual value of the tests is used for statistical inference.
We also apply the same bootstrap methodology for our statistical inference regarding volume and volatility. It is important to allow for cross correlations across stocks also for those variables, whose distribution is empirically highly non-normal.
IV. Empirical results
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The procedure is properly modified to estimate the variance for the readmission abnormal return of event windows number 2 and 4, which, as already discussed, is the sum of unobserved daily residuals over the suspension period. In this case the number of bootstrapped residuals varies across companies depending on the length of the suspension period. For a company which is readmitted after 13 days for example we extract 13 residuals from the bootstrap estimation period and sum them to obtain the readmission residual.
A. Data and summary statistics
We have used three data sets for our empirical work. We have collected daily data for 1,440 by float. 16 We thank Takeshi Inoue of Nomura Institute of Capital Market Research for kindly providing us with these data. 17 However they are included in the tests of the pricing models that we perform for the period 1998-2005. 18 These companies are included in the tests of the pricing models when they actively trade but not in our event study.
B. Estimating multifactor models for the Chinese stock market
We experiment with several risk pricing models for the Chinese stock market. We consider a simple market model, a three factor Fama-French (1996) A similar methodology is applied to stocks ranked according to their floating ratio (the ratio of tradeable to nontradeable stocks for each company) to build the floating ratio portfolio (FR), which is long stocks with a high floating ratio and short stocks with a low floating ratio. We have followed Wang and Xu (2004) We test the validity of the various pricing models over the period 1/1/1998-1/4/2005, a total of 1,762 days (holidays are excluded). Scholes and Williams (1977) point out that the use of daily returns can produce several problems in estimation of factor models, like biased estimates of variance and serial correlation. We follow Dimson (1979) and include the lagged value of the market return among the independent variables 20 .Our starting sample includes almost half of the total number of companies quoted in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Once a new company is listed on the market, it is added to the sample. At the end of the period there are 1,329 quoted companies.
The analysis of the pricing models uses data for the period January 1998-April 2005, before the start of the NTS reform process. We replicate our tests over 3 sub-periods (1998-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2005) to take into account some modifications that have been made to the listing system, see To compare the performance of the various models, we consider their ability to price the returns of 33 sectors in the Chinese market. This corresponds to an "out-of-sample" testing strategy of the type suggested by Cochrane (2006) . We have built the returns of the 33 sectors by using the Datastream classification which assigns each company to one sector. Table V The remaining factors are also frequently relevant.
In order to formally test the asset pricing model we use a time series methodology and run an OLS regression of each sector return on the returns of the risk replicating portfolios. We then consider the constants of the various equations and use two statistical tests described by Cochrane (2006) .
The first is the classical Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) statistic (GRS statistic) 
and S is the long run covariance matrix corrected to take into account of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (see Cochrane (2006) page 234). We will refer to this test as chi-square test. The Fama-French model is strongly rejected but the other three models are not. The Wang-Xu model extended to allow for liquidity risk is in our opinion the most suitable candidate for determining abnormal returns in our event study.
C. Price reactions
Tables VIIA and VIIB and figure 3 report results of the CAR analysis for the 1,009 companies included in our sample. The CAR analysis was repeated using residuals from all the four pricing models considered in table VI. The results are qualitatively similar. For reasons of space we only present results for the market model and the four-factor liquidity model.
All the models give coherent estimates of the abnormal returns before the first suspension, showing that there is an abnormal increase in the price amounting to about 2.5% in the nine days before the first suspension (2.59% for the market model and 2.54% for the multifactor model). This result may be explained by the possibility of information leakage about the identities of the companies joining the various batches . While all the cumulative residuals are significant according to the CLM and the CS tests, the bootstrap more frequently rejects the null hypothesis of no significant residuals, especially in the case of the market model residuals.
On the readmission day there is a further increase in the price equal to 0.15% for the market model (not significant at 5% for the three versions of the test) 0.25% for the multifactor model (strongly significant for the bootstrap). This is of course an average number, as only 60% of the companies show an increase in the price. We expected heterogeneous reactions to the compensation announcements on the part of the various companies, which may be explained on the basis of the surprise component implicit in each announcement 22 .
After the initial jump upon readmission, prices keep growing in the subsequent nine trading days, to reach a cumulative increase of 2. 369%. The results are strongly significant regardless of the variance estimates used in the tests. When the interval between the first readmission and the second suspension is viewed from the point of view of the second suspension, i.e. we count ten days going backward from the date of the second suspension rather than going forward from the date of the first readmission, we find a price increase of 5.3%. This result is not independent of the one obtained for the period after the first readmission, as several companies have an horizon equal to or smaller than nine day s between the two suspension periods and therefore fall in both empirical analyses. These results are a sign of strong inefficiency if they are interpreted as a delayed reaction to the details of the reform announced before the first readmission. We will return to the interpretation of these results after presenting empirical results about volume and idiosyncratic volatility and their relation with abnormal returns.
Finally, on the day of the second readmission, opening prices are on average 0.192% higher than they were when they last traded before the second suspension. According to the bootstrap this is significant at the 5% but not at the 1% level. There is a small discrepancy between the results of the market model and those of the multifactor model as the former predicts a decrease in price of 0.112% which is however not significant. When we look at the second cumulative return, including both the return between the return over the suspension period and the return of the first day of trading, closing prices on the readmission day are 0.17% higher than they were wh en they last traded before the second suspension. Notice that here we refer to the compensation-corrected prices.
On the day of the second readmission the raw prices register a decrease of 16.7% which is however almost totally associated with payment of the compensation. Nine days after the readmission day risk-corrected prices have dropped 0.4% but this is not significant at 10%. Re member that we are describing risk-corrected returns. In particular, returns are net of market returns. The Chinese stock market has been growing strongly over all the period under consideration, so that in most cases abnormal negative returns are compatible with positive returns. Figure 3 illustrates the abnormal returns cumulatively measured since nine days before the start of the reform for each company. The figure highlights that nine days after the end of the reform process, corrected prices are on average 4.5% higher than they were nine days before the beginning of the process.
The overall path can hardly be reconciled with rational valuation. The increase in prices before the first suspension may perhaps be explained by information leakage and speculative activity on the part of investors even though that would imply a predominant expectation of a positive compensation surp rise or the belief that prices had not adjusted to the reform in the previous periods. The second phase seems to be associated with a late reaction to the new information released on the day of the first readmission. Speculative activity is likely to play a major role in these dynamics. We therefore turn to measuring the proxies for speculative activity suggested by HSX (2006), i.e. volume and idiosyncratic volatility and to link them to abnormal returns.
D. Volume and volatility
Our measure of volume is total turnover defined as the number of shares traded for a stock on a particular day. Table VIII reports the (simple) average turnover for the stocks participating in the reform process.
The average is reported before, during and after the reform process. In each case we report both the absolute value of turnover and its share with respect to the total turnover of the market. For example, the absolute value of the turnover for the stocks joining the reform process one month before suspension (338 million units for the Shanghai market) is the simple average across stocks of the daily turnover in the four weeks preceding the start of the reform process. The number represents 0.10% of the total turnover of the market over the same period. Turnover however increases by 69% in the period after the first readmission (and before the second suspension) with respect to the level before the reform. The increase is 55% for the Shenzhen market and 78% for the two markets together. Volume increases by 116% in the month after the second suspension (with respect to volume before the first suspension) for each single market.
These numbers clearly indicate the existence of an increase in turnover after the reform. To study this issue in detail we compute and analyze abnormal volume, using two alternative methodologies.
The first follows Brav and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003) . We define normal volume as the mean daily volume from day t-120 through day t-11 relative to the day of the first suspension.
Abnormal volume is the percentage difference between actual volume and normal volume. To eliminate the effect of outliers we set observations exceeding the 99 th percentile equal to the median observat ion. Table IX and Figure 5 23 confirm the large increase in volume. Table IX shows that ten days before the first suspension actual volume is 19% larger than normal volume, an increase reaching 87% the day before suspension. However the table also clearly shows that the large increase in volume is unequally distributed across firms. The median is very often negative in this sub-period, even when the mean is large. For example, five days before the first suspension, the mean abnormal volume is 29% but the median is -11%. This is a signal of nonnormality of the empirical distribution and highlights the relevance of our bootstrap in evaluating the relevance of the statistics. The bootstrap shows that the average increase in volume is significant in most of the event period.
On the day of the first readmission, volume is 157% higher than normal, an increase that reduces to 55% after 10 days. On the day of the second readmission volume is 518% higher than normal, an increase that reduces to 104% after 10 days. 24 When judged by the bootstrap, increases in volume are statistically significant, especially after the second readmission.
We also compute abnormal volume following Ajinkya and Jain (1989) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) . This is based upon the residuals of a regression of the company (capitalization corrected) 23 Table IX considers the same four sub-periods already studied for returns, while figure 5, for simplicity, only reports results for three periods, i.e. the period before the start of the reform process, the period after the first readmission and the period after the second readmission. 24 We also repeat the computations for a modified abnormal volume which takes into account the increase in the float after the second readmission, but the results are very similar. 25 The measure of volume is defined as:
, where it V is money volume on day t for stock i, and it MV is the market value of the outstanding shares on stock i on day t. 26 The equation is estimated on the basis of OLS to retrieve the residuals. The residual is then regressed on its own lag and the slope coefficient is used as an estimate of the AR(1) coefficient to transform the original data as in the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Finally, OLS is applied to the transformed data.
The cumulative residual analysis described in table X shows that companies entering the reform process have a positive abnormal volume in the period preceding the first suspension. Bootstrapbased statistical inference shows that however the increase is significant only in the two days before the first suspension. This result is coherent with that obtained from the analysis of returns for the market model, showing a significant abnormal increase in prices in the two days before the suspension. The two results together reinforce the hypothesis that the increase in prices is due to information leakage.
Volume keeps increasing relatively to the market in all sub-periods after the first readmission. A very strong increase in volume takes place after the second readmission. Ten days after the second readmission abnormal volume is as large as 28.7%.
As to volatility, we adopt t wo alternative measures. The first is the standard deviation of returns; the second is the price range, defined as the percentage spread between the highest and the lowest values of the stock price on any given day. The price range is a very efficient volatility estimator as emphasized by Alizadeh, Brandt and Diebold (2002) . Moreover it has the advantage of providing a point estimate of volatility, contrary to what happens with the standard deviation which requires a time series of observations for its estimation.
On average the daily standard deviation of returns for a single stock is 3%, corresponding to an annualized value of about 50%. Figure 6 presents a graph of the price range across the usual subperiods. The figure shows clearly the large and permanent increase in volatility associated with the reform. Table XI documents that the empirical distribution of the range across firms is highly nonnormal, with huge differences between the mean and the median of the distribution . The table also shows that the increase in volatility is in general not statistically significant except for the day of the second readmission and the two days after that .
E. The cross section of abnormal returns
Finally, we perform a cross sectional analysis aimed at explaining the abnormal returns of stocks on the basis of volume and idiosyncratic volatility as well as control variables like the compensation surprise, size, a batch number dummy, a measure of the supply increase. The compensation surprise is included because the market price should react only to the compensation surprise on the day of the first readmission. We estimate the compensation surprise for the i-th company as the difference between the actual compensation (defined as the overall monetary value of the compensation package) and the time series average of the compensations paid by all the companies completing the reform process before company i. This is equivalent to assuming that expectations about compensation are formed on the basis of extrapolation from companies which already went through the reform. As robustness checks, we also estimate the surprise as the difference between (a) the number of tradeable shares in excess of the historical mean, ignoring other compensation channels and (b) the actual compensation and the average compensation paid by companies in the previous batch. The results are very similar.
Volume and volatility are included because of their importance in the theory of HSX (2006), according to which overvaluation caused by speculative behavior should also be associated with large volume and volatility. Volume is a reflection of differences of opinion across traders, induced by disagreement about the true value of the firm and idiosyncratic volatility is a proxy for objective uncertainty about value. We alternatively measure volatility in terms of historical standard deviation and in terms of price range but we report only the latter results as they are qualitatively similar.
A batch number dummy is included to allow for learning on the part of investors about the reaction of stock prices to details of the reform process for each company. We expect in particular that investors were more uncertain about the price reaction associated with compensations offered by companies belonging to the early batches and that the accumulation of experience made possible the recognition of patterns of reaction, perhaps not completely rational and associated with speculative activity.
Finally, the current supply increase, as measured by the percentage increase in the number of tradeable shares, is included to evaluate the relevance of limited risk absorption and negatively sloped demand functions. The current supply increase should affect prices if the demand curve slopes down. The existence of a bubble should make the float elasticity of price even larger, especially if the increase in supply is associated with a bursting of the bubble. We will return to this issue in commenting our empirical results. MSX (2005) have shown that supply is cross-sectionally negatively associated with the bubble. Here we perform a different test, as our dependent variable is not the spread between the prices of A-shares and B-shares , as in MSX (2005), but the percentage change in the price of A-shares.
We run the cross section four times, to explain the jump in prices (i) on the day of the first readmission, (ii) between the first readmission and the second suspension, (iii) on the day of the second readmission and (iv) after the second readmission. Therefore, differently from what we do earlier, we group together the periods after the first readmission and before the second suspension, and separately study the point jump upon the first and second readmissions. The returns on the two readmission days are measured in terms of percentage difference between the opening price of the readmission day and the last closing price before the suspension period. In theory one would expect all the effects to be absorbed by the opening price due to the information having been released well in advance of the readmission. However price discovery might take several hours so that it is important to evaluate robustness of the results to an alternative definition of returns. We therefore try an alternative specification where the initial return is measured in terms of the percentage difference between the closing price of the readmission day and the last closing price before the suspension period. The results of this second specification are very similar and are not reported for reasons of space. In all cases the cross section are repeated to consider as a left-hand side variable the residuals from all the four pricing models that we use. Results are reported only for the market model and the four-factor models (see table XII); the other results are similar and are available upon request.
The dummy for the batch number is significantly negative for the two readmission dates as well as for the period following the first readmission. So when prices go up on average, they tend to increase more strongly in the initial phases than at the end of the reform process. There seem to be no objective reasons associated with fundamentals that may explain such a dampening down of the reaction, except for a sort of learning phenomenon on the part of investors. One should keep in mind that the Chinese stock market (unexpectedly) performed exceptionally well during the implementation of the reform process and this may have made price discovery more difficult.
In the case of the first readmission, the sign of the compensation surprise is positive, as expected. A positive compensation shock induces investors to an upward revision in the price. Volume also has the expected sign and is strongly significant, coherently with the model of HSX (2006) . Volatility has the wrong sign but is not significant. Size is significant. We also run this regression excluding size but the results do not change qualitatively. The structure of the results is fairly similar in the period between suspensions. Volatility is now significant and positive. The compensation surprise is still relevant, pointing to the possibility of delayed reactions on the part of investors.
The jump on the day of the second readmission is negatively related to the increase in the supply of tradeable shares. Other things being equal, a 1% increase in supply produces a 0.174% decrease in the compensation-corrected prices. A 33% increase in supply, corresponding to the sample value, has therefore produced, according to the linear model and keeping other variables constant, a 5.8% decrease in prices. The impact of supply is partly reversed in the period following the second readmission, where the coefficient becomes 0.032%. This means that about one fifth of the decrease in prices due to the supply shock is reversed in the few days after the shock. The supply shock is not the only relevant variable on the day of the second readmission. The batch dummy has a negative coefficient, but volatility, volume and size are all positive. Large firms therefore tend to have lower decreases in prices on the day of the second readmission. Speculation seems to have a large part as shown by the relevance of volatility and volume, coherently with HSX (2006).
In the final sub-period, following the second readmission, there is a delayed effect of the increase in supply, which contributes to partially increase prices, but nothing else is significant. These results are coherent with those of our event study showing a small downward drift in prices. After-reform stocks seem to be less interesting to speculators. As a consequence, their prices rise less than the market as a whole.
Qualitative results do not change when the returns of the four periods are redefined in order to consider the closing and not the opening price. Moreover qualitative results do not change if we include the following variables: dummy for the companies included in the first batch, dummy for the Shanghai market, dummy for companies with B -shares outstanding, squared term for compensation, squared term for increase in supply.
V. Interpretations and conclusions
To reduce segmentation in the stock market, Chinese authorities have asked companies to eliminate their outstanding nontradeable shares through a reform process involving compensation to holders of shares that were already freely tradeable on the stock market. Usually compensation usually was carried out assigning a fraction of nontradeable shares to holders of tradeable shares whit the right to immediately trade these shares in the stock market. Elimination of nontradeable shares was expected to have deep consequen ces for the market as a whole. On the positive side, it was hoped that removal of nontradeable shares might have a positive impact on liquidity and corporate governance. On the negative side, it was feared that the resulting increase in supply could have excessively decreased prices. This concern has been motivated the prohibition to immediately sell the nontradeable shares that have remained in the hands of the original owners through lock-up periods lasting at least one year.
In this paper we have carried out an event study, based on estimation of various mu ltifactor models and statistical analyses of their abnormal returns, both from a time series and a cross sectional point of view. We have used a bootstrap methodology to allow for cross-correlation among the abnormal returns of the various companies. We have also studied volume and volatility as proxies of (2006) can explain some of our empirical findings once we interpret increases in volume and volatility as proxies for speculative activity on the part of retail investors.
From a policy point of view our results justify the precaution of the Chinese authorities with respect to the elimination of nontradeable shares. We have measured a quantitatively important negative supply effect on prices, which other factors, like volume and volatility, have more than offset in aggregate terms with a positive price impact. Moreover, lock-ups are likely to have been very helpful in stabilizing the market, both for its reduction in the immediate supply increase and for the potentially positive effect on demand. The model of HSX (2006) shows that the expectation of future increases in supply due to selling from insiders may be beneficial to current prices when traders are overconfident. The ample future supply potentially coming from sale of nontradeable shares may therefore have been a positive and stabilizing force on the market.
Overall, the reform has been highly successful. The market has been able to absorb a 33% increase in supply with moderately negative effects on prices. The extra supply may have created an increase in demand through speculation induced by a combination of short sale constraints, behavioral biases and fundamental uncertainty. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese stock market will be able to sustain the future supply increases associated with expiration of lock-ups, which are going to be much higher than the supply shock analyzed in this paper. HSX (2006) explains why expected increases in supply may positively affect stock prices before the event and negatively affect stock prices when supply actually increases takes place. The necessity to absorb a potentially large future increase in supply in the context of a market with a downward sloping demand function may prove to be a difficult challenge for the Chinese stock market. On the other hand, participation of both domestic and foreign investors in the market is still low, so that increasing popularity of stocks may more than absorb the future increase in supply. Exchange. Column (IV), (V) and (VI) provide information about the length (in days) of the first suspension period, the length after the first readmission period and the length of the second suspension period. Column (VII) reports the percentage of non-tradeable shares before the start of the reform process. Column (VIII) reports the average number of shares paid to a shareholder holding 10 tradeable shares. Column (IX) and (X) report the average price to book value and the marked value (computed from day t-25 t hrough t-1 relative to the day of the first suspension) of the companies in the various batches. Table IV . Risk F actors. The table contains summary statistics about the risk factors. The factors are: the Shanghai market index, the Shenzhen market index, our float-weighted market index, a size portfolio, a value portfolio, a floating ratio portfolio, a liquidity portfolio. Panel A reports correlations, Panel B reports summary statistics (mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, total performance) over the whole sample, Panel C to E report summary statistics over three sub-samples. The data in Panel B-E refer to daily percentage returns except for the total return which refers to the return over the whole sub-sample. R of the regression, the third column reports the value of the estimated intercept of the regression (alpha), the columns from the fourth to the eighth report the estimated sensitivities to the risk factors, robust standard errors in parentheses, *significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. following asset pricing models: the simple market model, the Fama-French including the market portfolio, a size portfolio (SMB) and a value portfolio (HML), the WangXu model including the market portfolio, a size portfolio (SMB), a floating ratio portfolio (FR) and an extended WangXu model which includes the market portfolio, a size portfolio (SMB), a floating ratio portfolio (FR), a liquidity portfolio (HLIQMLLIQ). Risk replicating portfolios are computed following the methodology introduced by Fama and French (1996) . The liquidity-replicating portfolio (HLIQMLLIQ) is built following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . The models are compared in terms of their ability to price returns from the 33 sectors described in table V. Under the null hypothesis all the pricing error are jointly equal to zero. P-values are computed both assuming that errors are correlated over time and heteroskedastic (chi square test) and assuming that errors are normally distributed, i.i.d. and homoskedastic (GRS test). Testing is performed over the long sample 1998-2005 and over the sub-samples 1998-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2005 . Table VIIA . Event Study Conducted on the Residuals from the Market Model. The table reports results of the mean cumulative abnormal returns and the mean average abnormal returns for the 1,009 companies included in the sample. The event study is performed on the residuals from a market model. For each company the model is estimated over a period including observation between t-120 and t-10 where t is the day of the first suspension. The estimated parameters are then used to compute the abnormal returns over the event windows. The abnormal returns are summed to form cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CARs are then averaged across companies to obtain the mean cumulative abnormal residuals (MCAR). MCARs are computed for the 9 days before the first suspension, the ten days after the first suspension, the ten days before the second suspension, and the ten days after the second readmission (more precisely, the return between the price recorded on the second suspension and the opening price, the return of the first day measured as the difference between the closing and the opening and the returns for 8 subsequent days). Mean average abnormal returns (MAAR), defined as the mean across all firms of the average residuals for each firm, are computed for 10 days after the second suspension and 10 days before the second suspension. The null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is tested (a) under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals of different firms following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) (CLM variance) (b) under the assumption of no correlation across abnormal residuals (CS variance) and (c) using a general bootstrap analysis (bootstrap). The table presents the p-values for all the procedures and the percentage of abnormal positive returns.
Table VIIB. Event Study Conducted on the Residuals from the Wang-Xu Model with Liquidity Replicating
Portfolio. The t able reports results of the mean cumulative abnormal returns and the mean average abnormal returns for the 1,009 companies included in the sample. The event study is performed on the residuals from a Wang-Xu three factor model (market, size and floating ratio portfolios) extended to allow for a liquidity-replicating portfolio. For each company the model is estimated over a period including observation between t-120 and t-10 where t is the day of the first suspension. The estimated parameters are then used to compute the abnormal returns over the event windows. The abnormal returns are summed to form cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CARs are then averaged across companies to obtain the mean cumulative abnormal residuals (MCAR). MCARs are computed for the 9 days before the first suspension, the ten days after the first suspension, the ten days before the second suspension, and the ten days after the second readmission (more precisely, the return between the price recorded on the second suspension and the opening price, the return of the first day measured as the difference between the closing and the opening and the returns for 8 subsequent days). Mean average abnormal returns (MAAR), defined as the mean across all firms of the average residuals for each firm, are computed for 10 days after the second suspension and 10 days before the second suspension. The null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is tested (a) under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals of different firms following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) (CLM variance) (b) under the assumption of no correlation across abnormal residuals (CS variance) and (c) using a general bootstrap analysis (bootstrap). The table presents the p-values for all the procedures and the percentage of abnormal positive returns.
Table VIII. Turnover. The t able reports the simple average turnover (millions of shares traded for a stock on a particular day) for the stocks participating in the reform process. The average is reported for the month before the reform process, for the period between the two suspensions and for the month after the reform process. The table reports the absolute value of turnover, its share with respect to the total turnover of the market (Percentage) and its increment (Percentage change) with respect to the average value computed over the month before the first suspension. Brav and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003) . The sample is composed of 1,154 companies involved in the reform process form April 2005 through February 2007. Abnormal volume is the percentage difference between actual volume and normal volume, where normal volume is defined as the mean daily volume from t-120 through day t-11 relative to the day of the first suspension. The measure of volume is the turnover by volume expressed as the number of shares traded for a stock on a particular day. The periods considered are: ten days before the first suspension, ten days after first suspension, ten days before the second suspension and ten days after the second readmission. Table presents the mean, the median, and the standard deviation. P -values are computed by using the bootstrap distribution. Ajinkya and Jian (1989) model. For each company involved in the stock reform process the model is estimated over a period including observations between t-120 and t -10, where t is the day of the first suspension. The estimated parameters are then used to compute the abnormal volume over the event windows. Abnormal volumes are summed to form cumulative abnormal volume and then averaged across companies to obtain the mean cumulative abnormal volume residuals (MCAV). MCAV are computed for nine days before the first suspension, ten days after the first suspension, ten days before the second suspension and ten days after the second readmission. Mean average abnormal volume (MAAV) is defined as the across firms mean average residuals. MAAV is computed for the ten days after the second suspension and the ten days first the second suspension. The null hypothesis of no abnormal volume is tested (a) under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals of different firms following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) (CLM variance) (b) under the assumption of no correlation across abnormal residuals (CS variance) and (c) with a general bootstrap analysis (bootstrap). Table presents between actual price range and normal price range, where normal price range is defined as the mean daily price range from t-120 thought day t-11 relative to the day of the first suspension. The measure of price range is expressed as (Higher price -Lower price)/Lower price for a particular day. The periods considered are: ten days before the first suspension, ten days after first suspension, ten days before the second suspension and ten days after the second readmission. The Table presents the mean, the median, and the standard deviation. P-values are computed by using the bootstrap distribution. Table XII . Cross Sectional A nalysis. Table presents the results for cross sectional analyses where the independent variables are the batch number, the compensation surprise, the percentage increase in tradeable shares, price range, volume and market value. The batch number is a dummy representing the batch in which the company is included. The compensation surprise for the i-th company is the difference between the actual compensation (defined as the overall monetary value obtained from the product of the number of shares offered to the holders of tradeable shares and the price of the shares plus the value of cash plus the value of warrants) and the time series average of the compensations paid by all the companies completing the reform process before company i. The price range is the percentage spread between the higher and the lower price of the stock. The measure of volume is defined as: log[1+ V it ] / log[1+ MV it ] , where V it is money volume on day t for stock i, and MV it is the market value of the outstanding shares on stock i on day t. Market value is measured as the log of MV it . The cross section is run to explain the jumps in prices on the first readmission (I), the residual return between the first and the second readmission (II), the residual return on the second readmission (III) and after the second readmission (VI). Jumps are the residuals alternatively obtained from the market model and from the Wang-Xu model with liquidity-replicating portfolio. When analyzing the jump on the first readmission, the dependent variable is computed from the price on the last day of transaction before the first suspension and the readmission price while price range, volume and market value are computed on the day of the first readmission. When analyzing the jump between the first and the second suspension, price range, volume and market value are computed as the mean value of the variables over the days between the first and the second suspension. When analyzing the jump on the second readmission, the dependent variable is computed from the price on the last day of transaction before the first suspension and the readmission price while price range, volume and market value are computed on the day of the second readmission. When analyzing the jump after the second readmission, price range and log volume are computed as the mean value of the variables over the days after the second readmission. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by (*) for 10 percent, (**) for 5 percent and (***) for 1 percent. Table reports number of observations and R-squared. The cumulative residuals are computed with respect to nine days before the beginning of the reform process, that is ten days before the first suspension for each company. The first interval (referred to as "before first suspension" in the picture) refers to ten days before the first suspension. The second interval ("after first readmission") refers to ten days after the first readmission. The third interval ("after second readmission") refers to the return measured between the closing price before the second suspension and the opening price after the second readmission, the return measured between the opening price after the second readmission and the closing price of the same day and to eight days after the day of the second readmission. Figure 5 . Percentage Abnormal Volume. The figure presents the cumulative abnormal volume computed as in Brav and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003) . The sample is composed of 1,154 companies involved in the reform process from April 2005 through February 2007. Abnormal volume is defined as the percentage difference between actual volume and normal volume, where normal volume is defined as the mean daily volume in trading from t-120 thought day t-11 relative to the day of the first suspension. The abnormal volumes are summed to form cumulative abnormal volume. The periods considered are: ten days before the first suspension, ten days after first suspension and ten days after the second readmission. Figure 6 . Percentage Abnormal Price Range. The figure presents the abnormal price range computed as in Brav and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003) . The sample is composed of 1,154 companies involved in the reform process from April 2005 through February 2007. Abnormal high-low spread is the percentage difference between actual price range and the normal price range, where the normal price range is defined as the mean daily price range from t-120 thought t-11 relative to the day of the first suspension. Price range is defined as (Higher price -Lower Price)/Lower price) for a particular day. The periods considered are: ten days before the first suspension, ten days after first suspension and ten days after the second readmission.
